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Disclaimer 
 
 
This material is based upon work supported by the Midwest Technology Assistance 
Center for Small Public Water Systems (MTAC). MTAC was established October 1, 
1998 to provide assistance to small public water systems throughout the Midwest via 
funding from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) under section 
1420(f) of the 1996 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act. MTAC is funded by the 
USEPA under Grant No. X829218-01. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or 
recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the USEPA or MTAC. 
 
Midwest Technology Assistance Center 
Project Final Report 
 
 
Building Technical, Financial, and Managerial Capacity for Small Water 
Systems:  The Role of Consolidation, Partnership, and Other 
Organizational Innovations 
 
Research Team: John B. Braden (PI), Martin Jaffe (co-PI), Min-Yang Lee (Graduate 
Research Assistant) 
 
Goal: Assess the role of consolidation as a strategy for small community water system to 
achieve technical, managerial, and financial competency under the Safe Drinking 
Water Act. 
 
Methodology:  The research involved: (1) The development of a model of choice of 
regulatory compliance strategy in which water systems choose to continue 
independent operation or be acquired by another system.  The model generates 
hypotheses about organizational responses to regulation. (2) Collection and 
analysis of federal and state data on trends in the consolidation and performance of 
water systems serving communities of less than 10,000 people and to test 
theoretical predictions about organizational response to regulation. 
 
Findings: 
 
1) Factors Affecting Organizational Change 
 
The USEPA has devoted millions of dollars in recent years to programs aimed at 
strengthening the technical, managerial, and financial (TMF) capabilities of small 
systems.  Concerns about small system capabilities are driven by differences in (SDWA) 
compliance rates – a higher percentage of smaller water systems have water quality and 
reporting violations under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) than do larger water 
systems (NRC, 1997).  However, the best solutions may not always involve additional 
TMF investments.  Sometimes it may make more sense to turn the systems over to new 
owners who are better able to run water systems lawfully and economically. 
 
Problems of compliance with the SDWA can arise for many reasons.  Some are 
attributable to limited customer bases producing lower revenues to cover fixed costs, 
lower bond ratings making borrowing more costly, and higher per-customer service costs.  
On average, the per-household cost of infrastructure of small systems is more than three 
times greater than that of systems serving more than 10,000 people (USEPA, 1999) 
Combining resources and administrative structures across small systems can reduce 
overhead while also gaining economies of scale.  The resulting larger systems generally 
can afford greater technical sophistication and their bond issues to finance system 
improvements are more attractive in financial markets.  Thus, encouraging small water 
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system mergers and reorganizations can be an important strategy for improved 
compliance.  However, there are a variety of theories about how such organizational 
changes come about. 
 
A.  Institutional Theories  
 
There is a growing body of research examining the factors that most influence 
rapid organizational change, and what needs to be done within both the regulatory 
agencies and the water industry to encourage small systems to change.  Some of these 
studies of organizational change are based on empirically testing what academics call 
neo-institutional theory while some are descriptive surveys of industry practices that 
attempt to identify the key factors associated with specific small water system changes 
(such as system consolidation).  Development of a model to test organizational changes 
in small water systems might benefit from this research. 
 
Examining how well neo-institutional theory explains dramatic organizational 
change seems the most abstract of these research efforts, but might be the most useful in 
validating what many small water system operators have already learned through their 
own experience.  In explaining rapid organizational change, neo-institutional theory 
would look at organizational change from the perspective of the entire water supply 
industry, and propose that a water system’s ability to drastically restructure its services 
would be influenced by three factors (Greenwood and Hining 1996):  First, would be the 
degree that an organization is embedded in its institutional context (for example, be 
subject to industry and regulatory performance and operational expectations), second, the 
degree which different groups of organizations within the industry would have 
knowledge of what other groups within that industry are doing (especially in terms of 
practice innovations), and, third, the extent to which an individual organization would 
have both the ability and the willingness to change.   
 
Although researchers have not examined small water systems to test the 
applicability of neo-institutional theory, they have looked at rural hospitals in order to 
explain why some rural hospitals have radically changed their services (become nursing 
homes or substance-abuse facilities, for example) even when rural health services are so 
tightly constrained by accreditation requirements and so heavily regulated by state 
agencies (D’Aunno, Succi and Alexander 2000).  As predicted by the theory, these 
researchers found that regulations promoting organizational reliability and accountability 
(such as accreditation) or limiting market access (such as certificate of need laws) both 
inhibit organizational change, while state regulations intended to promote competition 
had no effect. In the tightly-regulated health industry, it was only when states specifically 
targeted interventions to promote change (for instance, by giving hospitals direct capital 
grants to convert) that rural hospitals were more likely to make radical change their 
services. 
 
The rural hospital study also found that public facilities were less likely to change 
than private ones.  Among the private hospitals, those belonging to larger multi-hospital 
systems were also more likely to change, suggesting that some of the radical changes 
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may have been undertaken to better meet the needs of their corporate parents rather than 
in response to new government policies.  This same entrepreneurial factors might help 
explain why local subsidiaries of large water companies might be more willing to 
innovate: for example, only a few years after New York City entered into an innovative 
agreement with the USEPA to work with local governments and farmers to buffer its up-
state reservoirs as an alternative to filtration (NRC 2000), the Illinois-American Water 
Company’s system in Alton, Illinois, negotiated a reduction in its return water 
sedimentation controls (and saved itself about $3 million) by entering into a similar 
stream-bank buffering agreement with a local land trust  
 
The institutional framework of small water systems, like that of rural hospitals, 
tends to be tightly coupled, especially with respect to being subject to stringent regulatory 
oversight required under the Safe Drinking Water Act.  Most state budgets are also 
currently constrained, suggesting that it is unlikely that state agencies would directly 
subsidize radical organizational change by giving small water systems direct grants to 
consolidate or regionalize their services. The theory would therefore predict that most 
small water system changes would be evolutionary and incremental, not revolutionary 
and dramatic, unless mandated industry-wide from the top-down. Regulatory mandates, 
such as management of disinfection by-products, require all water systems to modify 
their treatment processes rapidly, and therefore drive revolutionary industry-wide 
changes in tightly integrated institutional settings.  In such a highly integrated industry as 
water supply provision, individual water systems, especially public systems, are much 
more likely to institute only minor changes to their organizational structures or operations 
in the absence of such mandates. 
 
Despite these theoretical predictions of institutional inertia, some small water 
systems in fact do radically change their organizational structures.  In a descriptive six-
state survey of why small water system consolidate, the Cadmus Group (2002) found that 
political support, state goals promoting consolidation, and legislation mandating 
consolidation for troubled systems were all significant factors in promoting successful 
small water system consolidations.  Other factors influencing consolidation were 
cooperation among state agencies, the creation of regional water plans by regional bodies, 
and the development of state processes to identify likely candidates for consolidation. 
 
The Cadmus survey data tends to affirm neo-institutional theory.  Since most of 
these factors lie outside the scope of both the water supply industry and their state 
regulatory agencies, there is little that the industry (and state regulators) can do to 
encourage small water systems to consolidate other than to disseminate information about 
successful consolidations to other small water systems. Their analysis only confirms that 
radical change in small water systems, such as consolidation, remains the exception 
rather than the rule. 
 
B.  Historical Theories 
 
Despite institutional theory and recent water system surveys both suggesting that 
organizational change is relatively uncommon among small water systems, most water 
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utilities in the U.S. actually underwent enormous transformation in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries. Within just two or three decades, most urban water systems changed from 
being predominantly privately-owned to being predominantly publicly-owned.  What 
makes this historical transformation relevant today is that, at the time they were initially 
municipalized, many of these private urban waterworks had service areas and customer 
bases similar in size to those served by many small water systems today.  
 
Many economists and historians consider this historical shift of water systems to 
public ownership to be an anomaly.  Most other municipal utilities (such as electricity, 
gas, and telecommunications) remained in private ownership, and most of those other 
types of utilities are still privately-owned up to this day.  Scholars have struggled to 
explain this “institutional aberration” using sophisticated analyses of historical data to 
better understand why the ownership and management of so many water systems changed 
so significantly at the turn of the 20th Century.  Four different factors have been proposed 
to explain this organizational transformation: public health concerns, public finance 
pressures, contractual conflicts between private providers and their customers, and 
corruption.  
 
(i) Public Health and Safety.  
 
One major responsibility of government is to protect citizens against danger.  In 
the 19th Century, advances in medical knowledge led to huge changes in approaches to 
public health.  Public health crises often sparked public outcries for municipal water 
services.  A widely-cited example is the City of Chicago, which built its new water 
distribution and treatment facilities and initiated its project to reverse the flow of the 
Chicago River in order to flush sewage away from the City’s water supply, Lake 
Michigan, after 80,000 citizens died of typhus in 1885 (O’Connell, 1976).  Public 
concerns over fire risks also generated public dissatisfaction with private water 
companies.  Privately-owned waterworks were thought by many local officials to make 
most of their water supply decisions only to generate short-term profits from residential 
water sales rather providing sufficient water to public hydrants for municipal fire 
protection (Anderson, 1988).   
 
Recent scholarship has disputed the presumed public health deficiencies of private 
waterworks.  A 1999 study found that the transition of ownership did not bring about a 
significant reduction in water-borne disease outbreaks (Troesken, 1999).  In addition, 
private companies more frequently used filtration.  Nevertheless, the move to public 
ownership probably indicated a strong public demand for change and improvement and a 
prevailing sentiment that public ownership was more likely to produce results.   
 
(ii) Municipal Expansion and Finance Pressures.    
 
A second set of forces contributing to the municipalization of urban water 
supplies involves the rapid rate of municipal annexation that occurred in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries.  These municipal expansions greatly increased the service areas of 
urban waterworks, especially after modern indoor plumbing was introduced to residential 
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dwellings in the late-19th Century and residents wanting these modern conveniences 
demanded that additional water service be provided to their homes.  For example, when 
local improvement districts and private water companies were unwilling to expand their 
service areas to unincorporated areas to meet this new service demand, many suburban 
residents sought annexation to the City of Chicago as a means of connecting to its newly 
enhanced public water system (Keating, 1985).  
 
Associated with this rapid rate of municipal annexation was the ability of 
publicly-owned and financed municipalities to tap financial resources that were 
unavailable to private water suppliers at the turn of the 20th Century (Cutler and Miller, 
2005).  After the development of modern bond markets, waterworks financed by private-
investors simply could not raise capital as efficiently as municipalities could.  Municipal 
bonds provided sophisticated municipalities with the financial resources needed to meet 
rising demand for potable water at a time when the costs of constructing modern water 
systems to serve entire urban populations were too large for private firms to assume.   
 
The ability of government to enforce universal payment for services, and 
innovations in the bonding of public investments, undoubtedly increased the capacity of 
municipalities to take over and operate water supplies.  Nevertheless, private water 
companies have historically offered safe and significant returns to shareholders, so poor 
performance and financial weakness are not the necessary results of private ownership 
(Grigg, 1988).  
 
(iii) Contractual Conflicts.  
 
At the turn of the 20th Century, franchise arrangements between cities and private 
water companies often required the companies to improve water treatment or expand 
their service areas without being able to increase their rates sufficiently to offset these 
additional expenditures.  These fiscal limitations reduced dividends and thereby lowered 
the perceived value of their stock to their investors.  This decline in stock values, in turn, 
enabled municipal officials to later acquire the private water systems at reduced prices 
either by purchase, franchise revocation, or through the exercise of eminent domain, or 
by simply building a public waterworks to undercut the private system (Troesken and 
Geddes, 2003).  Moreover, the growing threats of public appropriation didn’t provide 
private water companies with many incentives to expand their operations or improve their 
facilities.  At the time, foregoing these improvements was a rational investment decision 
intended to bolster the private waterworks’ short-term profits, but it was also a decision 
that, over the longer term, served to reduce the value of the systems, and the 
compensation received by the owners, when they were later expropriated and 
municipalized by public officials.  
 
Contractual conflicts contributed to the simultaneous growth of state utility 
regulation, municipal ownership, and especially frequent litigation.  These factors have 
been shown to correlate with later expropriation (Troesken and Geddes, 2003).   
Furthermore, the substantial metering costs commonly required of private waterworks by 
many municipal franchises created a quandary for privately-owned water utilities: Unit 
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prices of water were often too low to justify spending by a privately-owned waterworks 
to install and read water meters, but failing to meter customers made it harder for the 
private waterworks to justify asking for increases fees.  Therefore, many private water 
companies that couldn’t adequately recover their metering costs had to rely on revenue 
transfers from government, further increasing the private utility’s exposure to contractual 
conflict and appropriation (Masten, 2004). 
 
(iv) Corruption.   
 
A fourth factor at work in the wave of municipalization was corruption.     
Historical experience has demonstrated the need for regulation of privately-owned 
utilities by state utility commissions and through municipal franchise contracts.  For 
example, studies of the emergence of municipal water systems in New York, Philadelphia, 
Boston and Baltimore in the early 19th Century show how public water boards and 
commissions were pitted against speculative private water companies, with the battle 
played out in the back-rooms of the state legislatures where service franchises were 
granted to private water systems (Blake, 1956). Corruption and back-room deals become 
a subtext of this historical narrative; in some cases, as in New York City, the private 
water companies were merely corporate shells through which wealthy investors engaged 
in banking and other financial enterprises unrelated to water supply provision.  Scholars 
have cited this concern over corruption by private water suppliers, and the larger 
Progressive national reform movement at the end of the 19th Century which embraced the 
cause of utility regulation, as a significant contributor to municipal expropriation of 
private water companies (Troesken, 2005).  
 
Many public water systems themselves later became instruments of urban 
machine politics, where patronage and politically-determined rate structures short-
changed infrastructure maintenance (Troesken, 2005). A major reason that corruption 
theories remain so relevant in explaining institutional change is that water supply history 
might have come full circle, with the alleged operational inefficiencies and fiscal deficits 
of “corrupt” public water systems providing the justifications for the growing interest in 
water supply privatization in recent years (NRC, 2002).    
 
C. Conclusions 
 
What can small water systems learn from institutional theory and the four factors 
that shaped organizational change in the water industry?  Neo-institutional analyses of 
hospital reorganizations suggest that privately-owned and managed health systems are 
more likely to change than publicly-owned ones.  The underlying logic might also apply 
to water systems.  Moreover, the theory suggests that change is more likely to be 
incremental than radical when an industry, such as water supply provision, is tightly 
coupled and its operations (and options) are constrained by regulatory and reporting 
requirements. 
 
Times were certainly different at the turn of the last century, when the regulatory 
context (rampant corruption, open-ended and perpetual franchises, and lack of regulatory 
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oversight) and capital markets differed so extensively from the institutional framework 
under which small water suppliers currently operate.  But the fact that all of these 
historical theories consider safety, utility regulations, and financing as being key catalysts 
for change still makes these factors relevant today. 
 
Health and safety concerns still account for most of the short-term pressures for 
change within the water industry.  USEPA and states mandate and monitor water system 
compliance with new drinking water standards and other regulatory mandates.  These 
include, for example, USEPA’s copper, lead, arsenic, pathogen, disinfection by-product, 
and radionuclide rules, which are driving new investments in treatment technologies.  
The large costs of these investments are beyond the reach of many small water utilities 
and the communities they serve.  For some, spreading the costs over a larger customer 
base through system expansion or consolidation with other systems is the most viable 
option.  
 
The need to purchase advanced treatment technologies, in turn, raises many of the 
issues that private water systems faced in meeting new demand at the turn of the last 
century, when cities were rapidly growing and privately-owned utilities’ access to capital 
was constrained.  These capital needs are likely to grow, in any case, simply because of 
the need to replace old pipes as well as to expand service to meet new demand.  On top of 
the water quality requirements, the American Water Works Association estimates that the 
industry has spent more than $2 billion in the past few years for water system security 
and emergency response planning prompted by the 2001 New York terrorist attack. 
 
Water bonds are considered by most analysts to be a safe investment, but bond 
returns are still influenced by the size and scale of the water utility.  It is usually easier 
for large water utilities to borrow money than smaller ones, because of their more 
sophisticated and larger administrative resources, and their bonds are often deemed safer 
investments because of their larger revenue streams.  State revolving loan funds can 
theoretically offer smaller water systems capital at lower rates than could private bond 
markets, but the demand for these funds outstrips the supply and communities face long 
waits for improvements that often cannot be put off. 
 
Finally, more stringent public oversight (both by state environmental protection 
agencies and by state public utility commissions) of water systems can influence 
institutional change.  Public utility commissions have resolved most of the historic 
problems of corruption, but regulatory red-tape can also impede needed improvements, 
especially if it limits a small utility’s ability to raise its water rates in order to pay for its 
growing treatment and operational costs, or denies its requests for expansion of its service 
area.  Larger water systems simply have greater administrative capacity to handle the 
reporting and the paperwork generated in meeting state public utility regulations.  
 
Similarly, growing state EPA oversight over treatment options and effectiveness, 
as mandated by USEPA regulations, creates a larger administrative, testing, and reporting 
burden for all water systems.  Larger systems, with their larger staffs, are better able to 
manage these burdens than smaller systems – it is no accident that most reported 
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violations occur with smaller systems, and that most of these violations involve missing a 
required report or failure to submit required test data on time.  So, in the same way that 
some scholars believe that contractual conflicts on the state and municipal level drove 
urban water system changes in ownership in the 19th and 20th centuries, state and federal 
conflicts may still create incentives for water systems to change their scale or operations 
in the 21st Century. 
 
2) Development of a Model to Assess How Regulatory Compliance  
Affects Institutional Organization 
 
Informed by the preceding review of organizational change theories, we have 
developed an economic and behavioral model that explores driving forces of 
organizational innovation for small water systems subject to the requirements of the Safe 
Drinking Water Act.  This section describes the model and tests its implications using 
data for small public water supply systems in six Midwestern states.   
 
A. Why Firms Merge 
 
Basic economic reasoning suggests that a firm will go out of business and exit an 
industry if it cannot make a profit.  However, drinking water systems may not operate 
with a profit motive.  Government-owned systems can be subsidized by taxpayers and 
may be viewed as important sources of employment or symbols of local prosperity.  
Other small systems are tied to specific residential developments and can also be cross-
subsidized. 
 
Two complementary economic explanations of merger and acquisition place 
perspective around consolidation in the drinking water industry.  One line of thinking 
holds that mergers are a mechanism to transfer assets from underperforming firms to 
successful ones (Dewey, 1961; Tremblay, 1988).  The other maintains that mergers are 
transactions in the market for corporate control, where management teams compete for 
the right to manage productive assets (Jensen, 1983).  These two points of view converge 
in our model of acquisition as a means to both match poorly performing systems with 
better management and to take advantages of economies of scale. 
 
In our model, a drinking water system gives its owner a stream of benefits (or 
losses) from continuing to provide water.  This includes current and future economic 
profits in the traditional sense, as well as penalties due to SDWA violations.  In a less 
traditional sense, these benefits also includes ”psychic'' benefits from providing water, 
such as pride in operating a water system, fulfillment of a perceived mission to provide a 
public service, or the extra employment that a water system brings to the community.  
There can also be psychic costs; a small, underperforming water system could be a major 
cause of stress due to regulatory pressures and public criticism.  These psychic costs 
typically do not enter into a profit-loss statement.  A traditional for-profit firm does not 
consider these psychic costs and benefits, but a small owner-operated or municipally-
owned system may take some of these psychic costs into account. 
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When a systems stops independent operation via merger, it incurs transactions 
costs.  These include costs of connecting infrastructure, regulatory costs, and 
restructuring costs.  These transactions costs also include any transfers paid to or from the 
acquiring firm as well as political costs from relinquishing control.  In the case of 
municipally owned water systems, transferring publicly owned assets to a private 
company may be a long, expensive political process.  A water system will be acquired if 
makes the current owner better off, that is, if the capitalized value of the profits is smaller 
than the transactions costs. 
 
Our behavioral model generates the following hypotheses: 
 
1. Small systems that cannot achieve economies of scale are likely to be acquired. 
2. Systems that frequently violate the SDWA have lower TFM capacity and are 
more likely to be acquired. 
3. Publicly-owned systems have higher political costs of merger and are less likely 
to be acquired. 
4. Systems that currently purchase water have lower transactions costs of completing 
a merger and are more likely to be acquired. 
5. Systems in resource-limited areas are likely to use merger as a way to exit the 
industry. 
 
In order to test and verify our behavioral model, we use a probit model to predict 
the probability of a water system being acquired. This type of econometric model has 
been commonly used to analyze factors influencing municipalization of drinking water 
systems (Troesken, 2003), plant exit in the meatpacking industry (Anderson: 1998), and 
mergers of publicly traded firms (Palepu: 1986).  We estimate two models; the first 
model is for the entire sample but contains not spatial data.  For the second model, we 
augment a portion of our dataset with some simple GIS data. 
 
B.  Data Used 
 
We gathered data on mergers of CWSs from primacy agencies in USEPA Regions 
5 and 7.  Six of the eleven state primacy agencies in these regions track consolidation and 
were able to supply data. These data were then combined with system characteristics data 
contained in USEPA's Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS) database, and 
county-level demographic data from the US Census and the Economic Research Service 
(ERS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  There are 6,502 observations of small 
water systems, of which 430 (6.61%) were acquired (ACQUIRED).  Because the 
collection of merger data is not standardized, the primacy agencies have data for varying 
periods of time.  For example, data on mergers span 11 years in Illinois, but only four 
years in Michigan.  In our statistical analysis, we control for this variability between 
states using a series of dummy variables.  A state-by-state summary of drinking water 
systems is presented in Table 1. 
 
Data from SDWIS includes information on service connections, number and type 
of drinking water violations, ownership, and water source.  A summary of the data and 
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associated hypotheses are presented in Table 2.  Service connections (SVC) are simply 
the number of connections that a water system serves.  Systems that are acquired tend to 
be smaller than systems that are not acquired.   
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Community Water Systems by Acquisition Status 
 
State Full Sample Acquired Not Acquired Observation Period 
IA 1032 211 821 1994-2004 
IL 1528 75 1453 1995-2004 
IN 753 62 691 1996-2004 
MO 1308 18 1290 2000-2004 
MI 1303 40 1263 2001-2004 
NE 578 24 554 1997-2004 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Community Water Systems and Hypothesized 
Effect on Merger Probabilities 
 
Variable Units Full Sample Acquired Not-Acquired Hypothesized Effect 
SVC connections 474 173 495 (-) Economies of Scale 
QUAL avg. violations/yr 0.167 0.208 0.164 (+) Lower management capacity 
MONIT avg. violations/yr 0.845 2.463 0.73 (+) Lower management capacity 
PUBLIC percentage 62.1% 30.1% 64.3% (-) Higher transaction costs 
PURCHASE percentage 18.4% 40.2% 16.9% (+)lower interconnection costs 
DENSVC Connections 
/mile 
67 96 65 (+) Nearby merger partners 
INCOME $10,000s 3.95 4.20 3.93 (-) Resource limitations 
GROWTH percentage 9.54 8.65 9.6 (-) Resource limitations 
METRO 
 
percentage 
 
44.4% 
 
56.6% 
 
43.5% 
 
(-) Resource limitations 
(-) High unit costs of merger 
DIST miles 6.786 3.296 7.187 (-) Lower connection costs 
MSA percentage 27.2% 33.1% 26.5% (-) High unit costs of merger 
 
 
Drinking water violations are classified by USEPA into two categories: 
monitoring/reporting violations and quality violations. Monitoring and reporting 
violations (MONITOR) include failure to adequately test drinking water, file a consumer 
confidence report, or a public note of drinking water quality.  Quality violations 
(QUALITY) include treatment type violations and maximum contaminant level 
violations.  Both types of violations are reported as the average number of violations by a 
system per year.  We use SDWA violations, particularly monitoring and reporting 
violations, as indicators of underperforming management.  Water quality violations may 
be indicative of underperforming management, inadequate capital investment, or both.   
 
Drinking water systems were categorized as public (PUBLIC) if they are owned 
by a federal, state, or local government.  Before accounting for any merger activity, 
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62.1% of drinking water systems in our sample were publicly owned.  Publicly owned 
water systems may have lower costs of capital, a perceived mandate to provide water, and 
high transactions costs of merger due to political reasons.  Therefore, we expect publicly 
owned water systems to be less frequently acquired. 
 
Small water systems that purchase water from another system account for 18.4% 
of the water systems in the sample.  Because these systems are already physically 
connected to, and accustomed to working with, another system, we hypothesize that 
systems that they are more likely to merge. 
 
We expect that by rural water systems will be more likely to exit the industry 
through consolidation because they are more likely to face adverse demographic trends, 
such as declining populations or static income levels. We use a modification of the ERS 
rural-urban continuum codes to control for how rural the service areas of water systems 
are, aggregated at the county level.  Counties are metropolitan if they are part of a 
metropolitan area of 250,000 persons or more (METRO); otherwise they are classified as 
non-metropolitan.  Following the NRC (1997), we expect systems located outside of 
these metropolitan areas to be more likely to merger in order to comply with SDWA 
regulations. However, in metropolitan areas, we believe that the per-unit costs of 
connecting water infrastructure is likely to be higher than in rural areas; this also implies 
that systems outside metropolitan areas will have lower transactions costs of mergers and 
therefore be more likely to merge. 
 
Because we lack data on the costs of potential interconnections, we construct a 
variable that represents physical interconnection costs.  We use the number of service 
connections per square mile per county (DENSVC) as a proxy for the cost of a system 
merger. In densely populated counties, the water supply network is likely to be more 
extensive, which would decrease the transactions costs of merger because there is a 
greater chance that two separate networks will be closer to each other.  However, in those 
counties, the higher densities may increase per-unit costs of constructing pipelines.  To 
account for this, we use also interact the METRO and DENSVC terms.  In order to 
control for resource limitations on small water systems, we include data from the 1990 
Census for population growth rate (GROWTH) and median income (INCOME).  Both of 
these measures are aggregated at the county level. 
 
For two states, Iowa and Illinois, we are able to incorporate spatial data into our 
analysis.  The spatial data supplied by the drinking water agencies in those two states 
were incomplete, so gaps in location information were supplemented by water system 
addresses that were geocoded using ArcGIS.  In this two-state subsample, to proxy for 
transactions costs, we construct a variable equal to the distance between the address of 
record of a water system and that of its nearest neighbor (DIST).  Also using ArcGIS, 
water systems located inside a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), as defined by the US 
Census, were identified.  We expect the MSA variable to function similarly to the 
METRO variable in the larger sample.  Interaction terms between MSA and DIST are 
included to control for the possibility of different unit costs of interconnecting two water 
systems across metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.   
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C.  Results  
 
Overall, the results are support our hypotheses concerning the factors that 
promote merge activity.  We report results first for the six-state sample, then for the two-
state subsample where geographic data are available to enhance the analysis.  
  
(i) Six-state sample with no spatial data 
 
Looking at the full sample (which does not include spatial data), Table 3 shows 
the effects that marginal changes in system characteristics will have on the probability of 
a merger.  For continuous variables, this is the change in probability of merger that 
results from a unit change in the independent variables.  For discrete variables, these are 
the change in probability that results from a change of the independent variable from 0 to 
1 (Greene, 2003).  In interpreting these effects, it is useful to note that six percent of the 
firms were observed to have merged.  Therefore, with no other information about the 
characteristics of a system, we would estimate that it has a six percent chance of being 
acquired. 
 
The results indicate that small systems are more likely to be acquired than large 
systems; however, this effect is relatively small.  To be precise, an additional 10 service 
connections lowers the probability that a system will be acquired by 0.6 percent.  While 
this effect is small in magnitude, it does support the theory that small systems are 
choosing to be acquired. 
 
The model also indicates that water systems with frequent SDWA violations are 
more likely to be acquired.  Water systems that average one quality violation per year are 
approximately 1.4 percent more likely to be acquired than systems that do not violate the 
SDWA.  Similarly, water systems with one monitoring violation per year are 
approximately 0.2 percent more likely to be acquired than systems with no SDWA 
violations. 
 
Publicly-owned water systems are approximately 6.5 percent less likely to be 
acquired that privately owned water systems.  This is consistent with high political costs 
of transferring ownership of public assets, which would discourage merger activity. 
 
As expected, water systems that purchase water are more likely to be acquired 
than systems that do not purchase water.  Water systems that purchase water are 14.6 
percent more likely to be acquired than systems than systems that were producing their 
own water.  Clearly, the transactions costs of completing a merger are much lower when 
the two systems have already connected, and the relatively large effect found here reflects 
these reduced transactions costs. 
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Table 3: Marginal and Discrete Effects Calculated After Estimating a Probit Model 
with and Without Spatial Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** - Significant at 5% level 
*** - Significant at 1% level 
a – Indicates a discrete effect; the effect of changing the value of a discrete variable from 0 to 1. 
 
 
 
County-level water system density increases the probability of an acquisition 
slightly.  An increase in the service connection density by 10 connections per square mile 
increases the probability of merger by approximately 0.21 percent.  This result is 
consistent with a hypothesis of our model: an increase in system density implies smaller 
distances separating distribution networks.  The costs of physically interconnecting two 
water systems would therefore be less expensive. 
 
Finally, water systems in metropolitan areas are approximately 0.1 percent less 
likely to be acquired than systems in non-metropolitan counties.  This result seems to 
support the NRC’s hypothesis that rural systems face more intense demographic 
pressures.  These systems may be using merger as a mechanism to relieve those pressures. 
 
ii) Findings with spatial data 
 
 We follow the analysis of Castillo, et al. (1997); however, instead of constructing 
prices of merger, we use the distance between a water system and it's nearest neighbor 
(DIST) as a proxy variable.  Also using ArcGIS, water systems located inside a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), as defined by the US Census, are identified.  We 
expect the MSA variable to function similarly to the METRO variable; unit-costs of 
merger may be higher due to physical construction costs in a densely populated area. 
Interaction terms between MSA and DIST are included to control for the possibility of 
Variable No Spatial Data Spatial Data 
SVC -6.1x10-5 *** -5.25*10-5 *** 
QUAL 0.0136*** -0.040 
MONIT 0.0021*** 0.0045*** 
PUBLICa -0.0646** -0.048*** 
PURCHASEa 0.1456** 0.142** 
DENSITY 2.10 x 10-4*** - 
METROa -0.001 - 
INCOME 6.78 x 10-3*** - 
GROWTH - 0.0013*** 
DISTANCE - 1.81 x 10-4 
MSAa - -0.0096*** 
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different unit costs of interconnecting two water systems across metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas.   
 
When spatial data are included and our model is re-estimated, we find similar 
results.  Again, the effect of size is relatively small; an additional 10 service connections 
lowers the probability that a system will be acquired by just 0.5 percent.  Water systems 
with one monitoring violation per year are approximately 0.45 percent more likely to be 
acquired than systems with no monitoring violations.  However the model finds that 
drinking-water quality violations have no statistically significant impact on the frequency 
of merger.  These findings imply that regulatory pressures may differ for quality versus 
monitoring violations, with the latter being more consequential for subsequent decisions 
about system management. 
 
With the spatially-explicit subsample, publicly owned water systems are 
approximately 4.8 percent less likely to be acquired that privately owned water systems.  
Water systems that purchase water are 14.2 percent more likely to be acquired than 
systems that were producing their own water.  Curiously, distance to the nearest 
neighboring water system has no impact on the probability of a water system to be 
acquired.  However, this unexpected finding may result from imprecise geocoding and 
the fact that distances between addresses of record may imperfectly represent distances 
between the pipelines of adjacent systems.  Finally, water systems in metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSA) are approximately 0.1 percent less likely to be acquired than 
systems in non-metropolitan counties. 
 
D.  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This type of model should not be used to predict whether a specific system will be 
acquired.  It is best suited to understand how changes in firm characteristics or policy 
might affect merger activity.  We also do not attempt to understand the internal decision 
making process of the acquiring firm.  These systems may be motivated to increase their 
capital base, capture profits due to increase returns to scale, or be required to acquire 
small systems by regulators.  Finally, we also do not attempt to explain other types of 
organizational innovation, including the formation of drinking water 
collectives/cooperatives or the decision to begin purchasing water. 
 
Our results support the theory that merger and acquisition is a method of 
improving corporate governance.  Anecdotally, operators of many small water systems 
lack the technical, financial, and managerial resources to provide reliable, safe drinking 
water.  Some of those operators are either unwilling or unable to acquire the requisite 
skills.  Future and current profits/losses as well as transactions costs play a role in 
determining if water systems will remain independent or choose to be acquired.  Our 
findings confirm that merger may be a means to exit the industry, increase the skill level 
of operators, and avoid future expenses associated with investment in (human and 
physical) capital.   
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Poorly performing systems, those with drinking water quality or monitoring 
violations, are more likely to be acquired than highly performing systems.  Furthermore, 
patterns of merger and acquisition activity in the drinking water systems indicate that 
transactions costs are likely to play a large role in affecting mergers in the industry.  
While encouraging consolidation is not a declared policy of EPA, inducing organizational 
changes may be an alternative means to raise the management skill of drinking water 
system operators. Encouraging small systems to form rural cooperatives or purchase 
water from a neighboring system might also be effective policies. 
 
We also find some evidence that smaller systems have a higher probability of 
acquisition.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that acquired water systems may be 
merging to achieve economies of scale.  However, this is by no means conclusive 
evidence.  It may also suggest that systems that are non-core components of a larger 
business (such as systems serving residential or commercial property developments) are 
essentially being spun-off or sold to a company or agency for which water supply is a 
core enterprise. 
 
 
3.  Dissemination 
 
(1) M-Y.A. Lee, “Consolidation as a Compliance Mechanism:  “Small Drinking Water 
Systems and the Safe Drinking Water Act.”  Presented to the Illinois Water 
Conference, Urbana, IL October 2006; also, presented to the Illinois Economics 
Association, October 2006. 
 
(2) M. Jaffe, J.B. Braden, and M-Y. A. Lee.  “The Why and Wherefore of Water 
System Mergers.”  On Tap, National Drinking Water Clearinghouse, West Virginia 
University (Forthcoming). 
 
(3) M-Y. A. Lee and John B. Braden.  “Consolidation as a Compliance Mechanism:  
“Small Drinking Water Systems and the Safe Drinking Water Act.”  Draft is 
provided in Appendix B of this report.  The paper is in revision for submission to a 
peer-refereed journal. 
 
(4) The paper noted in (3) was accepted for presentation to the University Council on 
Water Resources (UCOWR), July 2007, in Boise, Idaho, and to the American 
Agricultural Economics Association, July 2007, in Portland, Oregon. 
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Appendix A 
 
The Why and Wherefore of Water System Mergers 
 
Martin Jaffe,∗ John Braden∗∗ and Min-Yang Lee*** 
 
 The USEPA has devoted millions of dollars in recent years to programs aimed at 
strengthening the technical, managerial, and financial (TMF) capabilities of small 
systems.  These concerns about strengthening small system capabilities are driven by 
differences in Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) compliance rates – a higher percentage 
of smaller water systems have water quality and reporting violations under the SDWA 
than do larger water systems.  However, solutions are not always found in additional 
TMF investments.  Sometimes it makes more sense to turn the systems over to new 
owners.   
 
Compliance problems arise for many reasons.  Some are attributable to limited 
customer bases.  Fewer customers usually mean lower revenues to cover fixed costs, 
lower bond ratings making borrowing more costly, and higher per-customer service costs.  
In such cases, encouraging underperforming systems to combine resources and 
administrative structures can reduce overhead while also gaining economies of scale.  
Larger system generally can afford greater technical sophistication.  They also have 
greater attractiveness in bond markets.  Thus, encouraging small water system mergers 
and reorganizations can be an important strategy for improved compliance.   
 
There is relatively little research available on factors that precipitate mergers or 
reorganizations of small water systems. USEPA (2002) identified some general factors 
associated with successful water system consolidation, including stakeholder support, 
policies and legislation, and the existence of regional water organizations. Historical 
analysis suggests other possibilities in the drinking water industry, and careful statistical 
analysis provides insight into their importance. 
  
Most water utilities in the U.S. underwent enormous transformation in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. Within a period of just two or three decades, most urban 
water systems changed from being predominantly privately-owned to being 
                                                 
∗ Director and Associate Professor, Urban Planning & Policy Program, University of Illinois at Chicago. 
∗∗ Professor, Department of Agricultural & Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. 
*** Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Agricultural & Consumer Economics, University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign. 
The research reflected here was supported in part by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency through 
Award No. US EPA X82921801  and by project 0305 ACE of the Office of Research, College of ACES, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations 
expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
sponsors. 
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predominantly publicly-owned.  This historical transformation is relevant today because, 
at the time they were initially acquired and municipalized, many of these private urban 
waterworks had service areas and customer bases similar in size to those served by many 
small water systems today.  Furthermore, many of these municipalized systems were also 
perceived as underperforming in meeting the water quality and quantity demands of their 
eras. 
 
 Five different factors have been proposed by historians and economists to explain 
this historical organizational transformation: public health concerns, public finance 
pressures, contractual conflicts between private providers and their customers, corruption, 
and transaction costs.  Each of these may also influence contemporary small water system 
acquisitions and mergers. 
 
Public Health and Safety  
 
 In the 19th Century, public health crises often sparked public outcries for 
municipal water services.  For example, the City of Chicago built its new water 
distribution and treatment facilities and initiated its project to reverse the flow of the 
Chicago River to protect its Lake Michigan water supplies after 80,000 citizens died of 
typhus in 1885.  Public concerns over fire risks also generated public dissatisfaction with 
private water companies.  As York University economist Letty Anderson (1988) noted, 
many also thought that privately-owned waterworks made most of their water supply 
decisions only to generate short-term profits from residential water sales rather providing 
sufficient water to public hydrants for municipal fire protection.  
 
 Recent studies dispute the presumed public health deficiencies of private 
waterworks, including one by University of Pittsburgh economic historian Werner 
Troesken (1999) which found that the transition of ownership did not bring about a 
significant reduction in water-borne disease outbreaks.  In addition, private companies 
more frequently used filtration.  Nevertheless, the move to public ownership probably 
indicated a strong public demand for change and improvement and a prevailing sentiment 
that public ownership was more likely to produce results.   
 
Municipal Finance Pressures 
 
 A second set of forces contributing to the municipalization of urban water 
supplies involves the rapid rate of municipal annexation in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries.  These municipal expansions greatly increased the service areas of urban 
waterworks, especially after modern indoor plumbing was introduced to residential 
dwellings in the late-19th Century.  Residents wanting these modern conveniences 
demanded that additional water service.  For example, Ann Durkin Keating (1985), a 
history professor at North Central College in Illinois, noted that many suburban residents 
sought annexation to the City of Chicago as a means of connecting to its newly enhanced 
public water system when local improvement districts and private water companies were 
unwilling to expand their service areas to unincorporated areas. 
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 According to Harvard economist David Cutler and Grant Miller (2005), then a 
graduate student in health economics at Harvard, this rapid rate of municipal annexation 
was associated with the ability of publicly-owned and financed municipalities to tap 
financial resources that were unavailable to private water suppliers.  After the 
development of modern bond markets, private-investor and special-assessment financed 
waterworks simply could not raise capital as efficiently as municipalities could.  Bonds 
provided sophisticated municipalities with the financial resources needed to meet rising 
demand for potable water at a time when the costs of constructing modern water systems 
to serve entire urban populations were too large for private firms to assume.   
 
 The ability of government to enforce universal payment for services, and 
innovations in the bonding of public investments, undoubtedly increased the capacity of 
municipalities to take over and operate water supplies.  Nevertheless, private water 
companies have historically offered safe and significant returns to shareholders, so poor 
performance and financial weaknesses are not necessary results of private ownership.   
 
Contractual Conflicts   
 
 At the turn of the 20th Century, franchise arrangements between cities and private 
water companies often required the companies to improve water treatment or expand 
their service areas without being able to increase their rates sufficiently to offset these 
additional expenditures.  These fiscal limitations reduced dividends and thereby lowered 
the perceived value of their stock to their investors.  This decline in stock values, in turn, 
enabled municipal officials to later acquire the private water systems at reduced prices 
either by purchase, franchise revocation, or through the exercise of eminent domain, or 
by simply building a public waterworks to undercut the private system. Moreover, the 
growing threats of public appropriation removed economic incentives for private water 
companies to expand their operations or improve their facilities.  Foregoing these 
improvements was a rational investment decision intended to bolster the private 
waterworks’ short-term profits; however, this inaction further reduced both the long-term 
value of the systems and the compensation received by the owners, when they were later 
expropriated and municipalized by public officials.  
 
 Contractual conflicts contributed to the simultaneous growth of state utility 
regulation, municipal ownership, and especially frequent litigation.  Werner Troesken 
and Cornell University economist R. Rick Geddes (2003) correlated these factors with 
later expropriation, also noting that the substantial metering costs commonly required of 
private waterworks by many municipal franchises created a quandary for privately-owned 
water utilities: Unit prices of water were often too low to justify a privately-owned 
waterworks to spend money to install and read water meters, while failing to meter 
customers made it harder for the private waterworks to justify asking for increases in 
their usage charges and connection fees.  Further, as noted by Scott Masten (2004), a 
professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, many 
private water companies that couldn’t adequately recover their metering fees had to rely 
on revenue transfers from government, further increasing the private utility’s exposure to 
contractual conflict and appropriation. 
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Corruption  
 
 History has amply demonstrated the need for regulation of privately-owned 
utilities by state utility commissions and through municipal franchise contracts.  For 
example, Syracuse University historian Nelson Blake’s classic book examining the 
emergence of municipal water systems in New York, Philadelphia, Boston and Baltimore 
in the early 19th Century showed how public water boards and commissions were pitted 
against speculative private water companies, with the battle played out in the back-rooms 
of the state legislatures that granted lucrative service franchises to private water systems.  
 
Corruption and back-room deals become a subtext of Blake’s historical narrative; 
in some cases, as in New York City’s, the private water companies were merely corporate 
shells through which wealthy investors engaged in banking and other financial 
enterprises unrelated to water supply provision.  Werner Troesken (2005) later cited this 
concern over corruption by private water suppliers, and the larger Progressive national 
reform movement at the end of the 19th Century which embraced the cause of utility 
regulation, as a significant contributor to municipal expropriation of private water 
companies.  
 
 Troesken also ironically notes that many public water systems themselves became 
instruments of urban machine politics, where patronage and politically-determined rate 
structures filled the pockets of the well-connected while infrastructure maintenance was 
short-changed. A major reason that corruption theories remain so relevant in explaining 
institutional change is that water supply history might have come full circle, with the 
alleged operational inefficiencies and fiscal deficits of “corrupt” public water systems 
providing the justifications for the growing interest in water supply privatization today.  
 
Transaction Costs 
 
 A recent statistical study of Midwestern water system mergers by Min-Yang Lee 
(2006), a University of Illinois researcher, examined how the costs of reorganization 
affect the probability of merger.  Lee found that the two factors having the greatest 
influence on the transaction costs of water system mergers are the system’s form of 
ownership and the extent which the water system is already interconnected with an 
adjacent system.  Publicly-owned water systems were six percent less likely to be 
acquired than privately-owned ones.  This finding suggests that the transfer of public 
assets is fraught with greater political complexity and higher bureaucratic costs than 
transfer of privately held assets.  Water systems that purchased water were 13 percent 
more likely to be acquired than systems that were not already interconnected to an 
adjacent system.  The existence of an operating relationship between two water systems 
almost surely reduces the costs of further system integration through merger.  
 
Lee also found that small water systems located within wealthier metropolitan 
areas were also slightly more likely than average to be acquired.  Even though urban 
systems are theoretically more expensive to acquire than water systems in more rural 
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locations due to land costs and the number of parties interested in the transaction, their 
greater density of service connections also implies a relatively high ratio of operating 
income to fixed costs.  This could offset some of the higher transaction costs.  An 
increase in the service connection density by ten connections per square mile was found 
by Lee to increase the probability of merger by 0.08 to 0.2 percent. 
 
Encouraging Small System Mergers 
 
 Times were certainly different at the turn of the last century, when the regulatory 
context (rampant corruption, open-ended and perpetual franchises, and lack of regulatory 
oversight) and capital markets differed so extensively from the institutional framework 
under which small water suppliers currently operate.  But the ongoing importance of 
safety, utility regulations, and financing makes these factors relevant today. 
 
 Health and safety concerns still account for most of the short-term pressures for 
change within the water industry.  Public disclosure requirements expose systems to 
increased public scrutiny.   USEPA and states mandate and monitor water system 
compliance with new drinking water standards and other regulatory mandates.  These 
include, for example, USEPA’s copper, lead, arsenic, microbe, disinfection by-product, 
and radionuclide rules, which are driving new investments in treatment technologies. 
Since these investments are expensive, many small water utilities can most economically 
treat meet these new demands by spreading their water filtration and treatment costs over 
a larger customer base, rather than continually raising their water rates.  This creates an 
incentive for institutional change, especially through water system expansion or 
consolidation.  
 
 The need to purchase advanced treatment technologies, in turn, raises many of the 
issues that private water systems faced in meeting new demand at the turn of the last 
century, when cities were rapidly growing and privately-owned utilities’ access to capital 
was constrained.  These capital needs are likely to grow, in any case, simply because of 
the need to replace old pipes, expand service to meet new demand, and comply with post-
9/11 security needs.  Water service bonds are considered by most analysts to be a safe 
investment, but bond returns are still influenced by the size and scale of the water utility.  
It’s still often easier and cheaper for larger water utilities to borrow money than smaller 
ones because of their larger revenue streams.,   State revolving loan funds can 
theoretically offer smaller water systems capital at lower rates than could private bond 
markets, but since the demand for these funds outstrips supply, access to that capital can 
involve a long wait on a state priority list. 
 
 More stringent public oversight (by state environmental agencies and public 
utility commissions) of water systems can influence institutional change.  Public utility 
commissions have resolved most of the historic problems of corruption, but regulatory 
red-tape can also impede needed improvements, especially if it limits a small utility’s 
ability to raise its water rates in order to pay for its growing treatment and operational 
costs, or denies its requests for expansion of its service area. Larger water systems with 
their larger staffs simply have greater administrative capacity to handle the reporting and 
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the paperwork generated in meeting state public utility regulations as well as SDWA 
mandates. So, in the same way that some scholars believe that contractual conflicts on the 
state and municipal level drove urban water system changes in ownership in the 19th and 
20th centuries, state and federal conflicts may still create incentives for water systems to 
change their scale or operations in the 21st Century. 
 
Finally, reducing the transaction costs of acquisition could be a useful strategy to 
encourage mergers between water systems so that they can realize better economies of 
scale and thus achieve higher rates of regulatory compliance.  Lee’s statistical analyses of 
water system mergers in the Midwest reinforce current beliefs that merger can be an 
effective way for smaller water systems with SDWA violations to achieve regulatory 
compliance.  The fact that smaller water systems and water systems with SDWA 
violations are both more likely to be acquired gives some credence to those beliefs.   
 
However, this same analysis shows that small water systems in rural counties with 
lower incomes and low or declining growth rates are apparently not using merger as a 
compliance strategy, despite their higher rates of SDWA violations.  So if regulators and 
policy-makers want to encourage mergers as one way to shift more capital and resources 
to troubled small rural water systems, adopting policies to reduce the transaction costs of 
merger make a lot of sense.  Because water systems that purchase water often are 
acquired by the system that they purchase water from, adopting state and federal policies 
that encourage the transfer or sale of water between adjacent rural systems is likely to be 
the most helpful approach to reducing some of these costs.   
 
Other strategies can also be considered.  Either offsetting high transaction costs 
with direct grants or loans, or deregulating the merger process (especially if water 
systems are treated public utilities) will certainly encourage more mergers.  Reducing 
some of the political burdens on transfers of publicly-owned systems (by removing 
requirements for public referenda, for instance) might also reduce some of these costs, 
making mergers a more effective strategy for dealing with SDWA violations by small 
water systems.  
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Appendix B 
 
Consolidation as a Compliance Mechanism: Small Drinking Water Systems and the 
Safe Drinking Water Act 
 
Min-Yang Lee, Research Assistant 
Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Executive Summary: 
 This paper explores the role that consolidation can play in increasing the capacity 
of small water systems to provide safe, affordable drinking water.  We develop a simple 
model to explain water system acquisition; systems continue to operate if the profits 
(current and future) are greater than the net gains from being acquired (transfer payment 
minus transactions costs).  Using data from the Safe Drinking Water Information Systems 
(SDWIS), state primacy agencies, USDA, and US Census, we test our model.  We find 
that small systems with frequent Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) violations are likely 
to be acquired.  We also find that systems that purchase water and are privately owned 
are more likely to be acquired than systems that produce their own water and are 
government owned.  Together, we interpret these findings as evidence that water systems 
in are using merger as a compliance mechanism.   
 
Introduction 
Following the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) amendments of 1996, there has 
been considerable effort by government, research institutions, and the private sector to 
increase the technical, financial, and managerial (TFM) capacity of small drinking water 
systems to deliver safe, affordable drinking water.  With this goal in mind, legislators 
included operator certification requirements, Drinking Water State Revolving Fund 
(DWSRF) loans, and small system technology variances as part of those amendments.  
By comparison, there has been little effort directed towards understanding how 
organizational innovation can improve the capacity of small water systems to comply 
with regulations. We explore the role that consolidation can play in increasing the 
capacity of small water systems to provide safe, affordable drinking water.   
 
There are over 50,000 CWSs in the US, more than 90% of them are serve fewer 
than 10,000 people and thus are classified as small by USEPA. Compared to larger water 
systems, these small systems have higher per-customer infrastructure costs, are not able 
to take advantage of economies of scale and are more likely to violate SDWA regulations 
(USEPA:1999). 
  
Basic economic reasoning suggests that a firm will go out of business and exit an 
industry if it cannot make a profit. However, drinking water systems may not operate 
with a profit motive.  Government-owned systems can be subsidized by taxpayers and 
may be viewed as important sources of employment or symbols of local prosperity.  
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Other small systems are tied to specific residential developments and can also be cross-
subsidized. 
 
Small water systems, which are often rural, face demographic challenges in 
complying with the regulations of the SDWA.  According to the National Research 
Council, rural systems face difficult demographic pressures, such as decreasing 
populations and lower median incomes, that can make full-cost recovery difficult (1997). 
 
Merger is a possible organizational change by which systems can exit the industry 
in an orderly fashion.  We operate under a simple economic model to explain water 
system consolidation.  Then, examining recent data on water system consolidation, we 
find evidence that systems are more likely to merge if they currently purchase water from 
another system, have frequent drinking water violations, are privately-owned, or are 
small.  Inclusion of basic spatial data for a subsample of water systems leads to similar 
results.  Our results suggest that consolidation may be an effective way of increasing the 
compliance with the SDWA, therefore the overall quality of the US drinking water 
supply. 
 
Why Firms Merge 
Two complementary economic explanations of merger and acquisition place 
perspective around consolidation in the drinking water industry.  One line of thinking 
holds that mergers are a mechanism to transfer assets from underperforming firms to 
successful ones (Dewey, 1961; Tremblay, 1988).   The other maintains that mergers are 
transactions in the market for corporate control, where management teams compete for 
the right to manage productive assets (Jensen, 1983).  These two points of view converge 
in our view of acquisition as a means to both match poorly performing systems with 
better management and to take advantages of economies of scale. 
 
In our model, a drinking water system gives its owner a stream of benefits (or 
losses) from continuing to provide water.  This includes current and future economic 
profits in the traditional sense, as well as penalties due to SDWA violations.  In a less 
traditional sense, these benefits also includes any ``psychic'' benefits from providing 
water, which could include a pride in operating a water system, fulfillment of a perceived 
a mission to provide drinking water, or the extra employment that a water system brings 
to the community.  There can also be psychic costs; a small, underperforming water 
system could be a major cause of stress for a non-professional owner.  These psychic 
costs typically do not enter into a profit-loss statement.  A traditional for-profit firm does 
not consider these psychic costs and benefits, but a small owner-operated or municipally-
owned system may take some of these psychic costs into account. 
 
When a systems stops independent operation via merger, it incurs transactions 
costs.  These include costs of connecting infrastructure, regulatory costs, and 
restructuring costs.  These transactions costs also include any transfers paid to or from the 
acquiring firm as well as political costs from relinquishing control.  In the case of 
municipally owned water systems, transferring publicly owned assets to a private 
company may be a long, expensive political process.  A water system will be acquired if 
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makes the current owner better off, that is, if the capitalized value of the profits is smaller 
than the transactions costs. 
 
Our behavioral model generates the following hypotheses: 
1. Small systems that cannot achieve economies of scale are likely to be acquired. 
2. Systems that frequently violate the SDWA have lower TFM capacity and are 
more likely to be acquired. 
3. Publicly-owned systems have high political costs of merger and are less likely to 
be acquired. 
4. Systems that currently purchase water have lower transactions costs of completing 
a merger and are more likely to be acquired. 
5. Systems in resource-limited areas are likely to use merger as a way to exit the 
industry. 
 
In order to test and verify our behavioral model, we use a probit model to predict the 
probability of a water system being acquired. This type of econometric model has been 
commonly used to analyze factors influencing municipalization of drinking water 
systems (Troesken, 2003), plant exit in the meatpacking industry (Anderson:1998), and 
mergers of publicly traded firms (Palepu,1986).  We estimate two models; the first model 
is for the entire sample but contains not spatial data.  For the second model, we augment 
a portion of our dataset with some simple GIS data. 
 
 
Data Used 
We gathered data on mergers of CWSs from primacy agencies in EPA Regions 5 
and 7.  Six of the eleven primacy agencies in these regions track consolidation and were 
able to supply us with data. These data are then combined with system characteristics 
data contained in EPA's Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS) database, 
and county-level demographic data from the US Census and ERS division of USDA.  
There are 6,502 observations of small water systems, of which 430 (6.61%) were 
acquired (ACQUIRED).  Because the collection of merger data is not standardized, the 
primacy agencies have data for varying periods of time.  Data on merger occurrence 
spans 11 years in Illinois, but only 4 years in Michigan.  In our statistical analysis, we 
control for this variability using a series of dummy variables.  A state-by-state summary 
of drinking water systems is presented in Table 1. 
 
Data from SDWIS includes information on service connections, number and type 
of drinking water violations, ownership, and water source.    A summary of the data and 
associated hypotheses are presented in Table 2. 
 
Service connections (SVC) are simply the number of connections that a water 
system serves.  We hypothesize that systems that are acquired will be smaller than 
systems that are not acquired. 
 
Drinking water violations are classified into two categories: monitoring/reporting 
violations and quality violations. Monitoring and reporting violations (MONITOR) 
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include failure to adequately test drinking water, file a consumer confidence report, or a 
public note of drinking water quality.  Quality violations (QUALITY) include treatment 
type violations and maximum contaminant level violations.  Both types of violations are 
reported as the average number of violations by a system per year.  We hypothesize that 
SDWA violations, particularly monitoring and reporting violations, indicate 
underperforming management.  Water quality violations may be indicative of 
underperforming management, inadequate capital investment, or both. 
 
Drinking water systems were categorized as public (PUBLIC) if they are owned 
by a federal, state, or local government. Before accounting for any merger activity, 62.1% 
of drinking water systems in this sample were publicly owned.  Publicly owned water 
systems may have lower costs of capital, a perceived mandate to provide water, and high 
transactions costs of merger due to political reasons.  Therefore, we expect publicly 
owned water systems to be less frequently acquired. 
 
Small water systems that purchase water from another system account for 18.4% 
of the water systems in the sample.  Because these systems have already connected with 
another system we hypothesize that systems that purchase water are more likely to merge. 
 
We expect that the demographic pressures faced by rural water systems will cause 
them to desire to exit, when possible. We use a modification of the ERS rural-urban 
continuum codes to control for ruralness at the county level. Counties are metropolitan if 
they are in a metropolitan area of 250,000 persons or more (METRO), otherwise they are 
classified as non-metropolitan.  Following the NRC (1997) hypothesis, we expect 
systems located outside of these metropolitan areas to be more likely to merger in order 
to comply with SDWA regulations. Furthermore, in metropolitan areas, we believe that 
the per-unit costs of connecting water infrastructure is likely to be higher than in rural 
areas; this also implies that systems outside metropolitan areas will have lower 
transactions costs of mergers and therefore be more likely to merge. 
 
Because we lack data on costs of potential interconnection, we construct a 
variable to represent interconnection costs.  We use the number of service connections 
per square mile per county (DENSVC) as a proxy for the cost of a system merger. In 
densely populated counties, the water supply network is more extensive, which would 
decrease transactions costs of merging because two separate networks may be closer to 
each other.  However, in those counties, the per-unit costs of constructing pipelines may 
also be higher, due to those higher population densities. To account for this, we also 
interact the METRO and DENSVC terms. 
 
In order to control for resource limitations on small water systems, we include 
data from the 1990 Census for population growth rate (GROWTH) and median income 
(INCOME).  Both of these measures are aggregated at the county level. 
 
For two states, Iowa and Illinois, we are able to incorporate spatial data into our 
analysis.  The spatial data supplied by drinking water agencies in those two states was 
incomplete, so gaps in location information were supplemented by geocoding addresses 
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using ArcGIS.  We follow the analysis of Castillo, et al (1997); however, instead of 
constructing prices of merger, we use the distance between a water system and it's nearest 
neighbor (DIST) as an explanatory variable.  Also using ArcGIS, water systems located 
inside a Metropolitan Statistical Area as defined by the US Census, are identified (MSA).  
We expect the MSA variable to function similarly to the METRO variable; unit-costs of 
merger may be higher due to physical construction costs in a densely populated area. 
Interaction terms between MSA and DIST are included to control for the possibility of 
different unit costs of interconnecting two water systems across metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas.   
 
Results 
Overall, our results support our hypotheses concerning the factors that promote 
merger activity.  We report results first for the six-state sample, then for the two state 
sample where geographic information is available to enhance the analysis. 
 
In Table 3, we show the effects that marginal changes in system characteristics 
will have on the probability of a merger.  For continuous variables, this is the change in 
probability of a merger that results from a unit change in the independent variables.  For 
discrete variables, these are the change in probability that results from a change from of 
the independent variable 0 to 1 (Greene, 2003).  In interpreting these effects, it is useful 
to note that 6 percent of the firms were observed to have merged.  Therefore, with no 
other information about the characteristics of a system, we estimate that it has a 6 percent 
chance of being acquired. 
 
Six-State sample with no Spatial Data 
 
The results indicate that small water systems are more likely to be acquired than 
large systems; however, this effect is relatively small.  To be precise, an additional 10 
service connections lowers the probability that a system will be acquired by just 0.6 
percent.  While this effect is small in magnitude, it does support our theory that small 
systems are choosing to be acquired.  However, we note that systems that are larger tend 
to be publicly-owned; statistically, this results in larger standard errors for those 
coefficients, but does not bias the coefficients themselves. 
 
We also find evidence that water systems with frequent SDWA violations are 
more likely to be acquired.  An increase of 1 quality violation per year results in an 
increase of acquisition probability by 1.4 percent.  Similarly, an additional 1 monitoring 
violation per year increases acquisition probability by approximately 0.2 percent. 
 
We find that publicly owned water systems are approximately 6.5 percent less 
likely to be acquired that privately owned water systems.  The political costs of 
transferring ownership of public assets may be high, which would discourage merger 
activity. 
 
As expected, water systems that purchase water are more likely to be acquired 
than systems that do not purchase water.  Water systems that purchase water are 14.6 
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percent more likely to be acquired than systems than systems that were producing their 
own water. Clearly, the transactions costs of completing a merger are much lower when 
the two systems have already connected, and the relatively large effect found here reflects 
these reduced transactions costs. 
 
County-level water system density increases the probability of an acquisition 
slightly.  An increase in the service connection density by 10 connections per square mile 
increases the probability of merger by approximately 0.21 percent.  This result is 
consistent with a hypothesis of our model: an increase in system density implies smaller 
distances separating distribution networks.  The costs of physically interconnecting two 
water systems would be lower in those areas. 
 
Finally, we note that water systems in metropolitan areas are approximately 0.1 
percent less likely to be acquired than systems in non-metropolitan counties.  This result 
seems to support the NRC’s hypothesis that rural systems face more intense demographic 
pressures.  These systems may be using merger as a mechanism to relieve those pressures. 
 
Two-State subsample with Spatial Data 
 When spatial data is included and our model is re-estimated, we find similar 
results.  Again, the effect of size is relatively small; an additional 10 service connections 
lowers the probability that a system will be acquired by just 0.5 percent.   
 
Water systems with 1 monitoring violation per year are approximately 0.45 
percent more likely to be acquired than systems with no monitoring violations.  However 
with this model, we find that drinking-water quality violations have no statistically 
significant impact on the probability of merger.  These findings imply that regulatory 
pressures may differ for quality versus monitoring violations, with the latter being more 
consequential for subsequent decisions about system management. 
 
Publicly owned water systems are approximately 4.8 percent less likely to be 
acquired that privately owned water systems.  Water systems that purchase water are 14.2 
percent more likely to be acquired than systems than systems that were producing their 
own water. 
 
 Curiously, distance to the nearest neighboring water system has no impact on the 
probability of a water system to be acquired.  However, this unexpected finding may be a 
result of poor quality data due imprecise geocoding. 
 
Finally, water systems in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) are approximately 
0.1 percent less likely to be acquired than systems in non-metropolitan counties. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Although it is tempting, this type of model should not be used to predict whether a 
specific system will be acquired. It is best suited to understand how changes in firm 
characteristics or policy might affect merger activity in general.   We do not attempt to 
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understand the decision making process of the acquiring firm.  These systems may be 
motivated to increase their capital base, capture profits due to increase returns to scale, or 
be required to acquire small systems by regulators.  We also do not attempt to explain 
other types of organizational innovation, including the formation of drinking water 
collectives or cooperatives or the decision to begin purchasing water. 
 
Our results support the theory that merger and acquisition is a method of 
improving corporate governance.  Anecdotally, operators of many small water systems 
lack the technical, financial, and managerial resources to provide reliable, safe drinking 
water.  Some of those operators are either unwilling or unable to acquire the requisite 
skills.  Future and current profits/losses as well as transactions costs play a role in 
determining if water systems will remain independent or choose to be acquired.  Our 
findings confirm that merger may be a means to exit the industry, increase the skill level 
of operators, and avoid future expenses associated with investment in (human and 
physical) capital.   
 
Poorly performing systems, those with drinking water quality or monitoring 
violations, are more likely to be acquired than highly performing systems.  Furthermore, 
patterns of merger and acquisition activity in the drinking water systems indicate that 
transactions costs play a large role in affecting mergers in the industry.  While 
encouraging consolidation is not currently a declared policy of USEPA, inducing 
organizational changes may be an alternative means to raise the management skill of 
drinking water system operators. Encouraging small systems to form rural cooperatives 
or purchase water from a neighboring system might also be effective policies. 
 
We also find some evidence that acquired water systems may be merging to 
achieve economies of scale; smaller systems have a higher probability of acquisition.  
However, this is by no means conclusive evidence.  It may suggest that systems that are 
non-core components of a larger business (residential or commercial property) are 
essentially being spun-off or sold to an existing company. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Community Water Systems by Acquisition Status. 
State Full Sample Acquired Not Acquired Observation Period 
IA 1032 211 821 1994-2004 
IL 1528 75 1453 1995-2004 
IN 753 62 691 1996-2004 
MO 1308 18 1290 2000-2004 
MI 1303 40 1263 2001-2004 
NE 578 24 554 1997-2004 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Community Water Systems and Hypothesized 
Effect on Merger Probabilities. 
Variable Units Full Sample Acquired Not-
Acquired
Hypothesized Effect
SVC connections 474 173 495 (-) Economies of Scale
QUAL avg. 
violations/yr 
0.167 0.208 0.164 (+) Lower management capacity
MONIT avg. 
violations/yr 
0.845 2.463 0.73 (+) Lower management capacity
PUBLIC percentage 62.1% 30.1% 64.3% (-) Higher transaction costs
PURCHASE percentage 18.4% 40.2% 16.9% (+)lower interconnection costs
DENSVC connections/mile 67 96 65 (+) Nearby merger partners
INCOME $10,000s 3.95 4.20 3.93 (-) Resource limitations
GROWTH percentage 9.54 8.65 9.6 (-) Resource limitations
METRO 
  
percentage 
  
44.4%
 
56.6%
 
43.5%
 
(-) Resource limitations
(-) High unit costs of merger
DIST miles 6.786 3.296 7.187 (-) Lower connection costs
MSA percentage 27.2% 33.1% 26.5% (-) High unit costs of merger
 
Table 3: Marginal and Discrete Effects Calculated After Estimating a Probit Model 
with/without Spatial Data 
 
  No Spatial Data Spatial Data
SVC -6.1x10^-5*** -5.25*10^-5 ***
QUAL 0.0136*** -0.040
MONIT 0.0021*** 0.0045 ***
PUBLICa -0.0646 ** -0.048 ***
PURCHASEa 0.1456 ** 0.142 **
DENSITY 2.10 x 10^-4 *** -
METROa -0.001 -
INCOME 6.78 x 10^-3 *** -
GROWTH - 0.0013 ***
DISTANCE  - 1.81 x 10^-4
MSAa  - -0.0096***
** - Significant at 5% level 
*** - Significant at 1% level 
a – Indicates a discrete effect; the effect of changing the value of a discrete variable from 0 to 1. 
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